Bullock v. Klein by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-26-2012 
Bullock v. Klein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Bullock v. Klein" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 236. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/236 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
        
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2267 
___________ 
 
ANDREW J. BULLOCK, IV, INDIVIDUALLY, AND DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF 
OF: MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION 
 
v. 
 
ARTHUR S. KLEIN, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS 
PURPORTED BOARD MEMBER OF MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' 
ASSOCIATION; KENNETH O. SPANG, III, ESQUIRE; SCOTT F. WATERMAN, 
ESQUIRE; MARIE RITA GLEASON, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER 
CAPACITY AS TOWNSHIP MANAGER OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; THOMAS 
J. CRANDALL, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS PURPORTED 
BOARD MEMBER OF MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; 
GERARD J. BERGER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS PURPORTED 
BOARD MEMBER OF MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; 
SHAYNA F. BEST, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS  PURPORTED 
BOARD MEMBER OF MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; 
WILLIAM M. SUNICK, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS 
PURPORTED BOARD MEMBER OF MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' 
ASSOCIATION; JUDITH B. WETZEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY 
AS PURPORTED BOARD MEMBER OF MAIN STREET VILLAGE 
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; DONNA M. HOUGHTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND 
IN HER CAPACITY AS PURPORTED BOARD MEMBER OF MAIN STREET 
VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; PATRICIA A. EVANS, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS PURPORTED BOARD MEMBER OF 
MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; KATHRYN 
MARINICK, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS PURPORTED BOARD 
MEMBER OF MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; MAIN 
STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; PENCO MANAGEMENT, 
INC.; ELIZABETH A. SHINGLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS 
MANAGER AGENT FOR MAIN STREET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' 
ASSOCIATION; RONALD WHITE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS 
AGENT FOR THE PURPORTED BOARD OF MAIN STREET VILLAGE 
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HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; MONIKA GERMONO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN 
HER CAPACITY AS PURPORTED AGENT FOR PURPORTED MAIN STREET 
VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION; EDMUND S. PENDELTON, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF PENCO 
MANAGEMENT, INC.;  DONALD FRANCESCHINI, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS 
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF PENCO MANAGEMENT, INC.;  
BRYN MAWR LANDSCAPING CO INC; THOMAS J. FOGA, JR., INDIVIDUALLY 
AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS TREASURER OF BRYN MAWR LANDSCAPING; 
ATLANTIC ROOFING CORP.; CHRISTOPHER CONN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN 
HIS CAPACITY AS IT RELATES TO ATLANTIC ROOFING; JIM MILLER 
ROOFING AND SHEET METAL INC.; JAMES MILLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN 
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF JIM MILLER ROOFING AND SHEET METAL 
INC.; WISLER, PEARLSTEIN, TALONE, CRAIG, GARRITY & POTASH, LLP;  
BLACK, STRANICK & WATERMAN, LLP.; DAVID J. SCAGGS, ESQUIRE;  
BLAIR H. GRANGER, ESQUIRE; BLAIR H. GRANGER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.;  
TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; MS. EMELINE BALDASSARREE, INDIVIDUALLY 
AND IN HER CAPACITY AS BUILDING INSPECTOR OF TREDYFFRIN 
TOWNSHIP; TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT; 
ANDREW CHAMBERS, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS 
CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP POLICE 
DEPARTMENT; BARRAR, SGT., INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS 
POLICE OFFICER OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; OFC. JOHN/JANE DOE, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS/HER CAPACITY AS POLICE OFFICER OF 
TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; HUGH A. O'HARE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS 
CAPACITY AS CHIEF BUILDING CODE OFFICER OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; 
JUDY L. DIFILLIPO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; 
MARK DEFELICIANTONIO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; 
BILL DEHAVEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER 
OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; 
PAUL J. DRUCKER, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; 
WARREN E. KAMPF, ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP; 
E. BROOKS KEFFER, JR., ESQUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TREDYFFRIN 
TOWNSHIP; ROBERT Q. W. LAMINA, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS A  MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TREDYFFRIN 
TOWNSHIP; SOVEREIGN BANK 
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Andrew J. Bullock, IV, Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-01123) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: October 26, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Andrew J. Bullock IV, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s 
dismissal of his complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We will assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and recite only those 
pertinent to this opinion.  From 1997 to 2007, Bullock owned a home that was managed 
by the Main Street Village Homeowners’ Association (the “Association”).  Several 
incidents occurred during that time period, ultimately ending with the foreclosure and 
Sheriff’s sale of Bullock’s home.  As a result, Bullock filed his first complaint against 
fifty-six defendants, asserting federal and state law claims.  The District Court dismissed 
the federal claims for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted, lack of 
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standing, and because three of them were criminal in nature.  The state law claims were 
then dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We affirmed.  Bullock v. Klein
 Bullock then filed, on February 15, 2001, another action against forty-five of the 
same defendants from his previous case.  His complaint alleged substantially the same 
facts and claims as before, along with a derivative claim on behalf of the Association.  
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Bullock’s complaint should be 
dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata.  The District Court agreed.  (Dkt. No. 45.)  
Bullock timely appealed the dismissal of his complaint. 
, 341 F. 
App’x 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2009).  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s “application of res judicata to bar the appellant’s claims.”  Huck ex 
rel. Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. Dawson
 Bullock argues that “res judicata does not apply” because “[f]raud upon the court 
allows any court to treat any previous case as a nullity.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 3.)  All of the 
appellees argue that the District Court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata.  We 
agree. 
, 106 F.3d 45, 48 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 Three elements must be established to prevail on a motion seeking to invoke res 
judicata:  “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties 
or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”  Duhaney v. 
Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010).  Res judicata “bars not only claims that 
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were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought.”  In re 
Mullarkey
  In the prior case, Bullock alleged that certain parties, who are attorneys, 
committed a fraud upon the state court that prompted the Sheriff’s sale of his home.  The 
District Court, while not specifically mentioning “fraud upon the court,” nonetheless 
dismissed the claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  We then 
affirmed the District Court’s decision.  In this case, Bullock alleged that the same parties 
perpetrated the same fraud, based upon the same set of facts.  The District Court, again 
without specifically naming the claim, dismissed Bullock’s complaint. 
, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 The District Court properly held that Bullock’s claims are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata.  The dismissal of Bullock’s first complaint for failure to state a claim 
constituted a final judgment on the merits.  See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 
452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981).  Next, the second case indisputably involved the same 
parties as the first.  Finally, the subsequent suit that generated this appeal was based on 
the same cause of action, as the claims are virtually identical and arose out of the same 
set of facts. 1
 As his claims were already pursued in a prior suit, Bullock is precluded from 
raising them again.  
     
See Allen v. McCurry
                                              
1  Though Bullock brought a derivative claim on behalf of the Association that was not 
asserted in the first action, it does not undercut the application of res judicata, as it could 
have been raised in the previous case.  Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225.   
, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“Under res judicata, a 
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final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.”).  Given the 
“identity of facts, claims and parties” found between the first and second cases, the 
District Court properly dismissed Bullock’s complaint.  Huck
 Bullock argues that “the claim of Fraud Upon the Court” has never been 
addressed.  (Appellant’s Br. at 3.)  We disagree.  The claim was dismissed pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) in his first case, and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata in his 
second.  In any event, Bullock did not make any allegations that “meet the demanding 
standard for fraud upon the court,” which is justified only by “the most egregious 
misconduct directed at the court itself,” and must be “supported by clear, unequivocal 
and convincing evidence.”  
, 106 F.3d at 51.   
Herring v. United States
III. 
, 424 F.3d 384, 387 (3d Cir. 2005).    
 Appellees Atlantic Roofing Corporation and Christopher Conn request that we 
impose sanctions on Bullock, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.  That 
rule permits an award of damages and single or double costs to an appellee if we 
determine that the appeal is “frivolous.”  Fed. R. App. P. 38.  We employ “an objective 
standard” in determining whether an appeal is frivolous, and only impose damages under 
Rule 38 when an appeal is “wholly without merit.”  Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union 
Real Estate Equity & Mortg. Invs., 951 F.2d 1399, 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).  Because the 
issue of fraud upon the court was not specifically mentioned by the District Court, 
Bullock had “at least a colorable argument” in favor of his appeal, and we will not 
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impose Rule 38 damages.  Id.  Though we will deny the motion for sanctions, we will tax 
costs against Bullock under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39.  See
IV. 
 Fed. R. App. P. 
39(a)(2).     
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court 
dismissing Bullock’s complaint.  The motion for sanctions is denied.   
 
 
  
 
 
